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IT’S ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS ALL THE WAY DOWN – THE STRANGE NEW 





JORGE L. CONTRERAS* 
 
Today’s markets for technology products — from smartphones to home appliances to 
automobiles— are inherently global. This is especially true of products that embody technical 
standards –protocols like 5G, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and USB that are covered by hundreds, thousands, 
or tens of thousands of patents (so-called “standards-essential patents” or “SEPs”).1 Given the 
global scope and size of these markets, it is not surprising that patent litigation over standardized 
products is often conducted on a global scale. For example, when technology firm Vringo sued 
Chinese smartphone manufacturer ZTE for infringement of a group of wireless 
telecommunications SEPs, the litigation played out over four years across twelve different 
jurisdictions: the United States, Brazil, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, Netherlands, 
Romania, Australia, India, China and Malaysia.2  
This article looks at an increasingly important aspect of these global standards wars: the ability 
of a court in one jurisdiction to prevent a party from pursuing litigation in another jurisdiction 
using a procedural mechanism called the anti-suit injunction (ASI). To complicate matters further, 
a litigant may also petition a court in one jurisdiction to prevent a party from seeking an ASI in 
another jurisdiction – the so-called anti-anti-suit injunction (AASI).  And, curiouser still, litigants 
have recently re-invigorated the anti-anti-anti-suit injunction (AAASI), a procedural move that 
seeks to prevent a litigant from obtaining an AASI to block another litigant from requesting an 
ASI. If there is no theoretical limit to the procedural machinations to which parties can go in such 
disputes, it may, indeed, be injunctions “all the way down”.3  
 
The Nature of FRAND Disputes 
Many different types of disputes have arisen over the years in connection with technical 
standards and standard-setting.4 Recently, however, the highest-profile litigation in this area has 
involved disagreement over the royalty rate that a SEP holder may charge the implementer of a 
standard to operate under its SEPs. Under the policies of the standards development organizations 
(“SDOs”) in which most standards are developed, participants often agree to license their SEPs to 
_____________________ 
 
*  Presidential Scholar and Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. Professor Contreras 
has written and lectured extensively on issues concerning technical standardization, antitrust and intellectual 
property law. He has published more than 100 scholarly articles and chapters and is the editor of six books including 
the two-volume Cambridge Handbook of Technical Standardization Law (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2017, 2019). 
Prior to entering academia, he was a partner in the Boston, Washington DC and London offices of a major 
international law firm. He is a cum laude graduate of Harvard Law School (J.D.) and Rice University (B.S.E.E. 
and B.A.). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3647587




producers of standardized products on terms that are royalty-free or, in the alternative, which bear 
royalties that are fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”). However, because the 
meaning of FRAND is not widely agreed, disputes can arise regarding royalty rates and other terms 
that SEP holders must offer to potential licensees.5  
The typical remedy for infringement in U.S. patent cases is a reasonable royalty that 
compensates the patent holder for infringing products made, used or sold.6 Cases involving 
FRAND royalty determinations are somewhat different, as the court-assessed royalty does not 
represent compensatory damages, but the rate that the patent holder was contractually committed 
to offer the potential licensee.7 Thus, the outcome of such a determination is often the issuance of 
a royalty-bearing license by the patent holder, and the infringer’s payment of back royalties for the 
period prior to the issuance of the license. 
Jurisdictional Competition in  FRAND Litigation 
Courts adjudicating FRAND disputes face a dilemma. On one hand, patents are issued under 
national law and, by definition, have legal effect only in the issuing jurisdiction.8 On the other 
hand, the parties to FRAND disputes are often multinational corporations with operations (and 
patents) in jurisdictions around the world. In determining a FRAND royalty rate, a court must 
decide whether to focus only on the patents issued and asserted in its own jurisdiction, or to 
consider the global business relationship between the parties.  
In some cases involving FRAND determinations, courts have limited their analysis to the national 
patents before them. These cases have included Microsoft v. Motorola,9 In re. Innovatio,10 
Ericsson v. D-Link,11 and Optis v. Huawei.12 In each of these cases, a U.S. district court determined 
a FRAND royalty rate and awarded damages to the SEP holder based on the asserted U.S. patents 
only. 
However, in other cases, most notably Unwired Planet v. Huawei,13 a case that is currently on 
appeal to the UK Supreme Court, the court evidenced a willingness to fashion the terms of a global 
FRAND license between the parties, covering not only their national patents, but also foreign 
patents encompassed by the licensor’s FRAND commitment. A similar approach was taken by the 
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California in TCL v. Ericsson.14 That court also 
determined worldwide FRAND royalty rates that a phone manufacturer should pay to a SEP 
holder; however, the case was reversed and remanded by the Federal Circuit on other grounds, and 
its final resolution is uncertain. 
The intra-jurisdictional competition enabled by the ability of one national court to determine 
global FRAND rates can lead to two forms of legal “race”. First is a “race to the bottom” among 
jurisdictions — a well-documented phenomenon in which jurisdictions intentionally adapt their 
rules, procedures and substantive outlook to attract litigants.15 Second, disparities in judicial 
treatment of cases are likely to encourage parties to initiate litigation in the most favorable 
jurisdiction possible as quickly as possible, often to foreclose a later suit in a less favorable 
jurisdiction. This situation is referred to as a “race to judgment” or a “race to the courthouse,” 
which may prematurely drive parties to litigation rather than negotiation or settlement. And a 
natural corollary to this type of race is the attempt by one party to strike first by preventing another 
party from pursuing litigation in a jurisdiction that may be favorable to it. 
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The Anti-Suit Injunction 
 
Anti-suit injunctions are interlocutory in personam remedies issued by a court in one jurisdiction 
to prohibit a litigant from initiating or continuing parallel litigation in another jurisdiction. ASIs 
are established features of the international litigation landscape and have been known since the 
fifteenth century (when they were developed by the English common law courts to enjoin parallel 
proceedings in the equitable Court of Chancery, and vice versa).16  Today ASIs are issued most 
frequently by courts in the U.S. and UK, as they have historically been viewed with disfavor by 
courts in civil law countries.17 ASIs are issued in a wide variety of disputes including international 
commercial, antitrust and bankruptcy actions, as well as actions to prevent a party to an arbitration 
agreement from commencing litigation over the matter to be arbitrated.18 
In the United States, the legal standard for issuing ASIs is, as one commentator puts it, “ambiguous 
and fragmented”.19 Generally speaking, however, courts follow some variant of the three-part 
framework developed by the Ninth Circuit in E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores.20 Under the 
Gallo framework, a court considering a request for an ASI must first determine whether the parties 
and the issues in the action in which the injunction is sought (the local action) are functionally 
equivalent to those in the action sought to be enjoined (the foreign action). If not, an injunction 
barring a party from pursuing the foreign action would not reduce duplicative litigation, and would 
thus be unjustified. If the parties and the issues are functionally the same, the court must next 
determine whether resolution of the local action would be dispositive of the foreign action. 
Generally, a court is unlikely to find that an ASI is justified if the local action does not result in 
the resolution of the foreign action. Second, the court must assess whether any of the four factors 
identified by the Fifth Circuit in In re Unterweser Reederei21 are present. These factors include 
whether the foreign litigation would “(1) frustrate a policy of the forum issuing the injunction; (2) 
be vexatious or oppressive; (3) threaten the issuing court’s in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction; or 
(4) prejudice other equitable considerations.” Finally, if at least one of the Unterweser factors is 
present, the court must ask whether the injunction will have a significant impact on international 
comity.22 If not, then the ASI may be issued. 
 
ASIs in FRAND Cases 
 In recent years, the most significant use of ASIs has been in connection with global FRAND 
disputes. Specifically, a court reviewing a SEP holder’s compliance with a FRAND licensing 
commitment may issue an ASI to prevent the SEP holder from bringing foreign patent 
infringement claims (including injunctions against the sale of infringing products) until the 
question of licensing terms has been resolved in the issuing jurisdiction. Below some of the more 
significant ASI decisions in the FRAND context are summarized, illustrating the range of issues 
considered by the courts and the disparate outcomes that have emerged.23 
 
Microsoft v. Motorola 24 
 
Microsoft alleged that Motorola breached its commitment to offer Microsoft a patent license on 
FRAND terms in violation of the policies of two SDOs, the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). When negotiations 
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over the FRAND license requested by Microsoft broke down, Microsoft filed a breach of contract 
action against Motorola in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. Six 
months later, Motorola sued Microsoft for patent infringement in Germany. The German court, 
finding infringement, enjoined Microsoft from selling infringing Xbox and laptop computer 
products in Germany. In response, Microsoft sought an ASI from the federal court in Washington 
to prevent Motorola from enforcing the German injunction. 
The U.S. court first considered whether the issues in the two cases were effectively the same. Even 
though the suits technically involved different causes of action — breach of contract in the U.S. 
and patent infringement in Germany — the court determined that the resolution of the U.S. matter 
would be dispositive of the German matter. That is, if Motorola were found in the U.S. to have 
breached its FRAND obligations, then Motorola would not be entitled to seek injunctive relief 
against Microsoft in any jurisdiction, including Germany. Further, the U.S. court found that 
Motorola’s litigation tactics frustrated the court’s ability to adjudicate the issues before it. Thus, 
this prong of the analysis also weighed in favor of an ASI. Finally, the court found that comity 
concerns should not bar the ASI because Motorola did not initiate its German action until six 
months after Microsoft filed the action in Washington. In fact, because the suit was primarily a 
U.S. dispute lacking significant foreign issues, permitting the German injunction to stand could 
itself harm international comity. As a result, the district court entered the ASI against Motorola. 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 
 
Vringo v. ZTE25 
 
Vringo v. ZTE involved a multi-jurisdictional dispute over patents essential to ETSI’s 2G, 3G, and 
4G wireless telecommunications standards. Following the commencement of litigation, the parties 
began settlement discussions and entered into a mutual non-disclosure agreement (NDA). Once 
negotiations deteriorated, ZTE filed an antitrust action in Shenzhen, China, claiming that Vringo’s 
failure to grant ZTE a patent license on FRAND terms constituted an abuse of its market position. 
In order to support its claim, ZTE presented information that had been exchanged between the 
parties during the time that the NDA was in place. In response, Vringo brought a breach of contract 
action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York and sought an ASI 
“[requiring] ZTE to withdraw its Shenzhen complaint and [enjoining] it from pursuing the same 
or similar claims in that court.” The U.S. court declined to issue the requested ASI, reasoning that 
the applicable threshold criteria had not been satisfied. Although the parties to the two suits were 
the same, the court noted “[a] decision holding that ZTE breached the NDA would not necessarily 
foreclose the antitrust action in the Shenzhen court.” Specifically, “[t]he fact that ‘ZTE use[d] 
Vringo’s highly confidential opening offer as the basis for its claims that the offer constitutes an 
abuse of power’ does not foreclose the possibility that ZTE provided or will provide the Shenzhen 
court with other evidence and reasons from which it could conclude that Vringo abused its market 
position.” Accordingly, the court denied Vringo’s motion for an ASI. 
 
TCL v. Ericsson 26 
 
TCL v. Ericsson involved patents required to implement ETSI’s 2G, 3G and 4G wireless 
telecommunications standards. TCL filed a contract claim against Ericsson in the United States 
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District Court for the Central District of California alleging that Ericsson breached its obligation 
to license the SEPs at issue to TCL on FRAND terms. TCL also sought an ASI to prevent Ericsson 
from maintaining patent infringement actions against it under corresponding patents in France, 
Brazil, Russia, the UK, Argentina and Germany. In considering whether to grant TCL’s ASI, the 
district court recognized that the parties were the same in both the California and the foreign 
actions. Then, however, it dispensed with the remainder of the analysis, concluding instead that 
both parties “indicated their desire” that the California action should result in a ‘global resolution’ 
of their SEP licensing and damages claims. As a result, the court summarily granted TCL’s request 
for an ASI without further discussion. 
 
Apple v. Qualcomm 27 
 
In 2017, Apple sued Qualcomm in the District Court for the Southern District of California, 
alleging sixty-three separate causes of action relating, among other things, to Qualcomm’s 
licensing practices for patents essential to ETSI’s 3G and 4G standards. Shortly thereafter, Apple 
filed eleven additional actions against Qualcomm in the UK, Japan, China and Taiwan, each 
making similar allegations. In response, Qualcomm sought an ASI seeking to enjoin Apple’s 
prosecution of its foreign actions. Qualcomm argued that the foreign actions constituted “part of a 
single licensing dispute already before [the California] court” and were thus duplicative. The court 
disagreed, holding that Qualcomm failed to demonstrate that the issues in Apple’s U.S. and foreign 
actions were functionally similar in the sense that an adjudication of the claims in the U.S. would 
dispose of Apple’s foreign claims. Likewise, the court found that Apple’s foreign suits could be 
considered neither vexatious nor oppressive, as they were not unduly delayed or duplicative, and 
because Apple had a reasonable interest in challenging Qualcomm’s patents jurisdiction by 
jurisdiction. Finally, the court found that enjoining Apple’s foreign actions “would effectively 
deprive the relevant foreign courts of [their] jurisdiction to consider whether [Qualcomm’s 
licensing agreements] have anticompetitive effects” within their jurisdictions — a result 
intolerable to international comity. Accordingly, the court denied Qualcomm’s request for an ASI. 
 
Conversant v. Huawei and ZTE28 
 
In this UK case, Conversant owned four UK patents alleged to be essential to the implementation 
of ETSI mobile telecommunication standards. Conversant commenced a patent infringement suit 
against Huawei and ZTE, both Chinese manufacturers, in July 2017, requesting that a UK court 
determine FRAND terms for a license of its global portfolio of patents covering the ETSI 
standards. Concurrently, ZTE brought an action in the Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court in 
China requesting a determination of the FRAND royalty rate for Conversant’s Chinese patents and 
a declaration that Conversant’s prior licensing offers violated its FRAND commitments. ZTE also 
sought an injunction restraining Conversant from ‘unfair, unreasonable, discriminatory 
overpricing and other acts which are in violation of the FRAND principle,’ including the 
continuation of its UK proceeding.  
In response, Conversant alleged in the UK that ZTE’s pleadings in the Shenzhen case “directly 
attacked, and sought relief in respect of, the proceedings before the English court . . . and sought 
to block and frustrate the English [p]roceedings.” Accordingly, Conversant requested an ASI 
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barring ZTE from prosecuting its conflicting claims in Shenzhen. Soon thereafter, ZTE amended 
its Shenzhen complaint “to remove all claims for liability that might involve . . . damages or other 
financial relief . . . other than in relation to the FRAND royalty rate and FRAND licence terms for 
[Conversant’s] Chinese [p]atents.” 
The UK court explained that the test for granting an ASI depends on whether the foreign claims 
“were vexatious, in that they sought to obstruct, or could have had the effect of obstructing, 
pending proceedings before the English court; or of undermining or frustrating the performance of 
a judgment given by the English court.” The elements that ZTE had recently deleted from its 
Shenzhen complaint would have given rise to an ASI in the UK. However, in view of the amended 
complaint, no such injunction was required. 
 
Optis v. Huawei29 
 
In Optis v. Huawei, PanOptis (an affiliate of Unwired Planet) brought suit against Huawei in the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas for the infringement of six U.S. patents that 
PanOptis obtained from Ericsson and Panasonic. In addition to denying infringement, Huawei 
asserted that PanOptis breached its FRAND commitment to ETSI (which it inherited from Ericsson 
and Panasonic) with respect to five of the asserted patents. Shortly thereafter, Huawei brought suit 
against PanOptis in the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court in China, alleging breach of contract 
and antitrust violations. In the Shenzhen action, Huawei asked the court to set the FRAND royalty 
rate for PanOptis’s Chinese patents and to order that PanOptis cease all civil infringement actions 
against Huawei. In response, PanOptis filed a motion in the Eastern District of Texas seeking an 
ASI preventing Huawei from continuing its Chinese actions. 
The court denied the injunction, noting that: 
the Chinese actions only relate to Chinese patents. Thus, although there may be 
similar factual disputes about PanOptis’s global offer, and whether that offer 
complied with its FRAND obligations, the scope of any relief awarded by this court 
or the Chinese court extends only as far as jurisdiction allows. There is nothing 
obviously vexatious or oppressive in allowing the lawsuits to proceed 
simultaneously, nor would any relief awarded by either court overlap with relief 
awarded by the other. 
 
Huawei v. Samsung30 
 
In this case Huawei held patents that it claimed were essential to ETSI’s 3G and 4G wireless 
standards. In 2011, Huawei and Samsung began to negotiate a cross-license of their respective 
patents. After several years of negotiation, Huawei brought suit against Samsung in the Northern 
District of California, alleging that Samsung’s products breached eleven patents allegedly essential 
to the ETSI standards. At the same time, Huawei filed suit against Samsung in the Shenzhen 
Intermediate People’s Court in China. Samsung filed counterclaims in both actions. 
In 2018, the Shenzhen court found that Samsung infringed two of Huawei’s Chinese patents (both 
counterparts of patents asserted in the U.S. action), that Huawei had complied with its FRAND 
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commitments to ETSI, that Samsung did not comply with its own FRAND commitments and was 
largely responsible for the six-year delay in negotiations. Accordingly, the Shenzhen court issued 
an injunction prohibiting Samsung from manufacturing and selling smartphones with 4G LTE 
functionality in China. Samsung appealed the Chinese ruling and filed a motion in the Northern 
District of California to enjoin Huawei from enforcing the Chinese injunction. 
In analyzing Samsung’s motion for an ASI, Judge Orrick in the Northern District of California 
first considered the similarity of the actions before the courts in the U.S. and China. He observed 
that the positions of the parties were reversed from that in Microsoft v. Motorola. That is, in 
Microsoft, the German court granted Motorola an injunction against Microsoft without 
determining whether or not Motorola had complied with its FRAND commitments (a question 
then before the U.S. court in Washington).  In contrast, “the Shenzhen court issued injunctive relief 
because it found that Samsung had not complied with its FRAND obligations.” Thus, he concluded 
that the cases before the U.S. and Chinese courts differed significantly. Nevertheless, Judge Orrick 
found these differences “irrelevant” to the more important question: whether the local U.S. action 
would dispose of the Chinese action. As both actions depended on whether a party breached its 
FRAND commitment to ETSI, the U.S. court’s answer to this question would, indeed, dispose of 
the Chinese action. 
Moreover, the Chinese injunction posed a significant commercial risk to Samsung, “not just in 
China, but with impacts percolating around the world”. As such, the Shenzhen injunction would 
“interfere with ‘equitable considerations’ by compromising the U.S. court’s ability to reach a just 
result … free of external pressure on [Samsung] to enter into a ‘holdup’ settlement before the 
litigation is complete.” Accordingly, the court found that the integrity of the U.S. action would “be 
lessened without an ASI”. Finally, Judge Orrick found that the limited scope of the proposed ASI 
and its limited duration would present a “negligible” impact on international comity. 
Thus, the court granted Samsung’s motion to enjoin Huawei from enforcing the Shenzhen orders. 
 
The Anti-Anti-Suit Injunction (AASI) 
If a litigant believes that its opponent is likely to seek an ASI barring litigation in its preferred 
jurisdiction, then it may request an injunction preventing the opponent from seeking an ASI.31 This 
is the anti-anti-suit injunction (sometimes called a “counter-anti-suit injunction”).  Like the ASI, 
the AASI operates in personam, prohibiting a litigant from taking a particular action – in this case, 
petitioning a court for an ASI. Yet unlike an ASI, an AASI does not seek to bar a parallel action 
in another court, but to prevent the blocking of that action, effectively permitting the parallel action 
to continue. As such, the considerations that guide courts when considering ASIs are not directly 
applicable to their consideration of AASIs.   
 AASIs are sought less frequently than ASIs and there is no uniform framework defining when 
they will be granted. The leading U.S. case regarding AASIs is Laker Airways v. Sabena,32 an 
antitrust action brought in 1982 by a bankrupt British airline, Laker Airways, against a number of 
U.S. and non-U.S. airlines. Two British airlines obtained an ASI from a court in the UK prohibiting 
Laker from prosecuting its U.S. antitrust suit against them. Laker then obtained an AASI from the 
U.S. district court preventing Sabena, KLM and other non-UK airlines from joining the UK court’s 
ASI. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit upheld the AASI, reasoning that jurisdiction 
over the foreign airlines was proper in the U.S., that allowing them to evade liability under the 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3647587




U.S. antitrust laws would be contrary to U.S. public policy, and that principles of international 
comity dictated that the UK courts should not attempt to interfere with the jurisdiction of the U.S. 
court.  
 Then in the early 1990s, a trio of related cases arose in which a group of Texas asbestos 
manufacturers sought to obtain ASIs preventing Canadian residents from bringing personal injury 
tort claims against them in Texas.33 The Canadians, in turn, obtained AASIs from courts in Texas 
preventing the manufacturers from enjoining them from suing in Texas. In upholding the AASIs, 
the Texas appellate court discerned four purposes that such injunctions serve: “1) to protect a 
court's jurisdiction; 2) to prevent the parties from evading important public policies of the domestic 
forum; 3) to prevent a multiplicity of suits; and 4) to protect a party from vexatious and harassing 
litigation.”34 
 
AASIs and FRAND  
As noted above, ASIs are most commonly issued by courts in common law jurisdictions – 
primarily the U.S. and UK – while courts in civil law jurisdictions have historically found them 
“offensive, even violative of international law.”35 Thus, it is not surprising that civil law 
jurisdictions have recently begun to issue AASIs to prevent the enforcement of ASIs in FRAND 
cases. 
 
Continental v. Avanci  
Continental is a German-based supplier of automotive components including telematics control 
units (TCUs) that give an automobile 2G/3G/4G wireless capabilities. Nokia, Conversant, 
PanOptis and their respective affiliates hold numerous SEPs covering these wireless standards. 
Avanci is a Dallas-based entity that licenses wireless SEPs held by its members (including Nokia, 
Conversant and PanOptis) at a single rate.  Continental had sought for some time to obtain a license 
under these SEPs, but was informed that the SEP holders preferred to license automobile 
manufacturers rather than automotive suppliers (presumably because higher fees could be charged 
to these downstream users). Negotiations soon broke down and, in March 2019, Nokia filed ten 
separate patent infringement suits against Continental’s customer Daimler in the German Regional 
Courts of Munich, Duesseldorf and Mannheim, eight of which sought to enjoin Daimler’s sale of 
automobiles that contained 2G/3G/4G wireless connectivity capabilities.  
In May, 2019, Continental brought an action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California alleging that Avanci and its members, including Nokia, Conversant and PanOptis, 
violated their FRAND obligations as well as the Sherman Act and the California business code.36 
Then, in June, Continental petitioned the U.S. court for an ASI prohibiting Nokia and the other 
defendants from prosecuting their claims against Daimler in Germany or anywhere else.37 
Continental argued that “Nokia’s German lawsuits are an attempt to force Daimler and other 
[customers] to accept non-FRAND licenses before this Court has an opportunity to adjudicate the 
case on the merits,” and that “Nokia’s decision to seek injunctive relief in at least eight of the 
German Actions, and thereby acutely increase the pressure on Daimler … to accede to Nokia’s 
unfair royalty demands, is also directly contrary to U.S. policy.”  But before the U.S. court could 
respond, in July Nokia petitioned the Munich Regional Court to issue an AASI prohibiting 
Continental from enforcing an ASI against Nokia in Germany. The Munich court granted the 
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AASI, finding that the requested ASI preventing Nokia’s German actions would be incompatible 
with German law.38 In order to move quickly, before the U.S. court had a chance to act on 
Continental’s ASI motion, the Munich court issued its ruling in an ex parte proceeding, without 
oral argument or the involvement of Continental’s counsel.39  
 
IPCom v. Lenovo 
IN 2007, IPCom, a German patent assertion entity, acquired 160 patent families claimed to be 
essential to ETSI’s 2G/3G/4G wireless communications standards from Robert Bosch.  Since 
2014, IPCom sought to license these patents to Lenovo and its affiliates. Negotiations were 
unsuccessful and in March 2019 Lenovo brought an action in the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California,40 claiming that IPCom’s licensing offers were inconsistent with its 
FRAND obligations, asking the court to determine a global FRAND royalty for the patents, and 
alleging that IPCom’s actions constituted attempted monopolization in violation of Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act. IPCom responded in July 2019 with an action in the UK seeking a declaration 
that one of IPCom’s UK patents was essential to the standards and infringed by Lenovo, and to 
enjoin Lenovo from infringing the patent in the UK.41 In September 2019, Lenovo asked the U.S. 
district court for an ASI prohibiting IPCom from prosecuting any infringement action in the UK 
or elsewhere against Lenovo and its affiliates and customers during the  pendency of the U.S. 
action.42  
Before either the U.S. or UK courts made a substantive ruling in the case, in October 2019 IPCom 
brought an action in the Paris Court of First Instance, seeking both to enjoin Lenovo’s sale of 
allegedly infringing products in France, and also preventing Lenovo from enforcing the ASI. The 
Paris court ruled in favor of IPCom in November, 2019, holding that, except where they seek to 
enforce contractual arbitration or jurisdiction clauses, ASIs are contrary to French ordre public, 
and that “seeking an anti-suit injunction— such as the one pursued by Lenovo in California— 
would infringe upon IPCom’s fundamental rights pursuant to French laws protecting patents, 
property rights in general and procedural provisions regulating fair legal proceedings.”43 The Court 
of Appeal of Paris affirmed the lower court’s ruling in March, 2020.44 
In October, 2019, IPCom also filed a motion for an AASI in the UK. The UK court granted this 
motion in November, shortly after the decision of the Paris court.45  It reasoned that the principles 
of law applicable to an AASI are broadly the same as those that apply to the grant of an ASI, 
though an AASI presents “an even greater danger of interfering improperly with the conduct of 
foreign proceedings.” Nevertheless, the court found that “it would be vexatious and oppressive to 
IPCom if it were deprived entirely of its right to litigate infringement and validity of [its UK 
patent].”  The UK court enjoined Lenovo from employing its U.S. ASI to prevent IPCom from 
proceeding with its UK action. 
 
The Anti-Anti-Anti Suit Injunction -- Where Does it End? 
If an AASI can nullify the effect of an ASI, then why not seek an anti-anti-anti-suit injunction 
(AAASI) to prevent a litigant from seeking an AASI?  The AAASI is a rare but not unknown 
procedural mechanism,46 and has recently emerged in FRAND disputes.  
For example, in Continental v. Nokia, the Munich Regional Court issued an AASI prohibiting 
Continental from seeking an ASI in the U.S. that would have stopped Nokia’s pending German 
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actions against Daimler. Shortly thereafter, Continental petitioned the U.S. district court to issue a 
temporary restraining order preventing the other defendants (Avanci, Conversant, PanOptis and 
their affiliates) from seeking a similar AASI in Germany or elsewhere.47 The court denied 
Continental’s motion on procedural grounds,48 but if such a TRO had been granted, it would have 
been an AAASI.  
 
Conclusion 
The complexity, cost and unpredictability of high-stakes global FRAND disputes have markedly 
increased with the introduction of ASIs, AASIs and AAASIs. These rarified procedural 
mechanisms, conceived centuries ago to avoid the injustice of judicial decisions emanating from 
the ‘wrong’ courts, have devolved into mere tactical levers to be deployed in the service of any 
determined litigant with a sufficiently large war chest. Requests for these once-extraordinary 
remedies have now become routine as litigants jockey for advantage and race to judgment in the 
jurisdictions that they believe will be most sympathetic to their case. Moreover, courts in an 
increasing number of countries appear willing to grant these forms of relief. Whereas ASIs were 
once known only in the U.S. and UK, they and their more esoteric cousins AASIs and AAASIs 
have now been granted in other European countries. Recently, China’s most senior intellectual 
property judge suggested that China needs “strong countermeasures against foreign parallel 
litigation” – namely ASIs and AASIs.49 
But despite the complexity that they introduce on the international litigation stage, there is nothing 
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